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The Billion-Dollar Breakdown: Inside VIHFA’s Decade of Mismanagement, Fraud, and Failed Recovery

🏚 VIIQ DATA INVESTIGATION

Nine Years,
$1.3 Billion Unspent

A data investigation into VIHFA's decade of failed hurricane recovery — four directors, multiple fraud convictions, four federal audits, and a July 2026 HUD suspension that was years in the making.

Total Allocated
$1.92B
Spent After 9 Years
29%
Grid Funds Spent
<1%
HUD Suspension
Jul 20, 2026
Clarity IQ · VIIQ  ·  July 20, 2026  ·  Sources: HUD Suspension Letter · OIG Audits 2023–2026 · VI Consortium · St. Thomas Source · Legislature of the VI
01 · VIIQ

Recovery Program Completion — The Numbers

CDBG-DR · CDBG-MIT · Grid Resiliency · Admin spend
Total Allocated
$1.92B
CDBG-DR + CDBG-MIT + Grid
Disaster Recovery Spent
$571M
29% of CDBG-DR after 9 years
Admin Costs Consumed
$52.7M
55% of set-aside admin funds
Unspent (Deprived)
~$1.3B
Congress intended for residents
CDBG-DR — Direct Recovery Program Completion
Electrical Grid Recovery — Budget vs. Spent
CDBG-MIT — Mitigation Program Completion
Disaster Recovery vs. Admin Spending Pace
Recovery $1.92B (29% spent) Admin budget (55% spent)
02 · VIIQ

Leadership — Four Directors in Nine Years

Griffith → Clendinen → Jones → Clendinen (again)
Aug 2017 –
Feb 2022

4.5 yrs
Daryl Griffith
Executive Director

Led VIHFA through the critical first 4.5 years post-hurricane — the entire window when nearly all $2B was allocated. Launched EnVIsion Tomorrow in 2019. Faced constant criticism for slow pace on homeowner programs and ERAP. COO Darin Richardson's fraud scheme — the $4.5M lumber contract kickback — ran entirely during his tenure.

EnVIsion Tomorrow delays Richardson fraud on his watch ERAP poorly managed No stated reason for departure
Feb 2022 –
Apr 2024

2+ yrs interim
Dayna Clendinen
Interim Executive Director · Chief Disaster Recovery Officer

Held the interim role for over two years — an unusually long "temporary" tenure for an agency managing nearly $2B in federal funds. Both OIG Audits I and II landed during her watch. She is the named recipient of the July 20, 2026 HUD suspension letter and a named defendant in former COO Stephanie Berry's whistleblower lawsuit.

OIG Audits I & II on watch Named in whistleblower suit 2+ year "interim" tenure HUD suspension addressed to her
Apr 2024 –
Feb 2026

<2 yrs
Eugene Jones Jr.
Executive Director

Recruited as "Mr. Fix It" from the Atlanta Housing Authority. Testified that VIHFA had spent $315M of $1.1B at departure. Resigned under legislative scrutiny of the LBJ housing project and Stephanie Berry's whistleblower lawsuit alleging he personally discouraged staff from documenting problems.

Resigned under pressure Named in whistleblower suit $315M spent of $1.1B at departure First-Time Homebuyers $4M: $0 spent
Feb 2026 –
present

interim again
Dayna Clendinen (again)
Acting Leadership · COO & Chief Disaster Recovery Officer

Returned to acting leadership after Jones' resignation. The Executive Director position remained vacant and was still being advertised as of March 2026 — five months before the HUD suspension landed. Now holds the 30-day window to submit VIHFA's written response.

ED post vacant at suspension 30-day response deadline
03 · VIIQ

The Richardson Fraud — Criminal Record

$4.5M contract · kickback · 36 months federal prison
January 2021 — Contract Award

COO Darin Richardson steers lumber storage contract to Island Services Group (ISG). As chair of VIHFA's bid evaluation committee, Richardson awards ISG a contract initially valued near $3M. ISG subcontracts essentially all work to D&S Trucking, owned by Davidson and Sasha Charlemagne.

2021–2022 — Contract Inflation

Contract value amended three times, eventually exceeding $4.4M — a 50% inflation. $3.177M of VIHFA's $3.6M in payments passes through to D&S Trucking. Lumber sits in warehouses, largely unused.

February 7, 2022 — Kickback

ISG partner Morris Anselmi wires $107,000 to Richardson. Days later, Richardson formally recuses himself — but continues signing ISG checks. Uses $50,500 plus the $107,000 to purchase a property in St. Thomas.

January 2024 — Extension

Despite the lumber rotting in the tropical sun, VIHFA extends the ISG contract for another three years. No audit or corrective action triggered.

June 2024 — Indictment

Richardson indicted. Davidson and Sasha Charlemagne separately indicted on fraud and false statement charges tied to $3.177M in CDBG-DR funds. Over $582,000 had already been paid before any contracted work began.

March 2025 — Conviction & Sentence

Richardson convicted on all counts: bank fraud, money laundering, making false statements, criminal conflict of interest. Sentenced to 36 months federal prison + 2 years supervised release. HUD states his conduct is legally imputed to VIHFA.

July 2026 — Appeal Pending

Richardson released pending Third Circuit appeal. The Charlemagne trial has not yet gone to verdict. HUD cites the entire scheme as a direct basis for VIHFA's suspension.

Fraud Scheme — Money Flow
Additional Legal Exposure
Stephanie Berry whistleblower suit

Former VIHFA COO alleges financial mismanagement, improper procurement, wrongful termination. Names VIHFA, Jones, and Clendinen as defendants.

$6.2M FEMA duplication

VIHFA submitted vouchers to double-bill costs FEMA had already reimbursed at 90%. HUD warned VIHFA in 2019. VIHFA did it anyway in 2021–22.

OIG ongoing investigation

HUD OIG is investigating potential offenses by VIHFA's officers, directors, and/or employees. Scope is under privilege. Suspension remains in effect.

04 · VIIQ

Major Programs — Allocated Funds vs. Results

10 programs tracked across CDBG-DR, Grid, and HAF
Program Allocated Result Rating
EnVIsion Tomorrow — HRRP
Launched 2019. 2,084 applications, 610 eligible. 30 homes completed as of Feb 2024.
$135M~72 completed16%
EnVIsion Tomorrow — RRRP
Landlord program, up to $50K loan
$25MMinimal<5%
Multifamily Rental Rehab & New Construction
Largest housing bucket in CDBG-DR
319 of 1,64319%
ISG Lumber Storage Contract
Post-hurricane lumber for rehab — D&S Trucking subcontractor
$4.5MLumber rotted. $3.177M to Charlemagnes.Fraud
PR1 Grid Resiliency
Largest single electrical grid line item
$35.8M$177,976 spent (May 2026)<1%
FEMA Match Program
OIG 2023: duplicate billing despite 2019 HUD warning
Various$6.2M improperly billedImproper
Homeowner Assistance Fund (HAF)
Federal COVID-era program · Sept 2026 deadline
$8.5M$4.2M unspent at Jones exit~51%
First-Time Homebuyers Act
Legislature of the VI appropriation
$4M"None of that money has been spent" — Jones, Feb 20260%
Public Facilities (CDBG-DR)
Best-performing category
477 of 572 projected83%
CDBG-DR Remaining Balance
Grant expires September 30, 2029
$749.6MUnspent as of Jun 2025Active
05 · VIIQ

Legislative Oversight — What Lawmakers Knew and When

2021 → 2026 · hearings, testimony, and what followed
2021

Senate Finance Committee receives FY2022 budget testimony. Senators press on slow project completion. VIHFA's FY2020 audit was still not complete. The agency managing $2B in federal funds was years behind on its own financial audits.

2023

Senate Housing Committee receives EnVIsion Tomorrow update. Merchants Commercial Bank President testifies the bank had not closed a single mortgage using the VI Slice program since signing the MOA in March 2023 — eight months of zero closings.

Feb 2024

Senate panel confronts low completion rates. ODR Director testifies EnVIsion Tomorrow had 2,084 applications, 610 eligible, 30 homes completed — five years after launch.

Feb 2025

Jones testifies VIHFA has spent $315M of $1.1B. Sen. Carla Joseph questions FEMA de-obligation risk. ODR Director confirms the 10% local match was only reduced to 2% in February 2024 — six years after the hurricane money arrived.

Feb 2026

Jones announces resignation at a Senate hearing. $4.2M in HAF funds face a September 2026 expiration deadline. Sen. Vialet presses Jones on the Legislature's $4M First-Time Homebuyers appropriation. Jones: "None of that money has been spent yet."

Jul 2026

HUD suspension drops July 20, coinciding with the start of early voting. No formal Legislature oversight hearing has been convened on the suspension as of publication. Governor Bryan holds press briefing, calls action an overreach.

06 · VIIQ

Governor Bryan's Response — July 20, 2026

Government House press briefing · HUD vs. Bryan claim-by-claim
Key Quotes — Press Briefing

"It seems like much of an overreach from my perspective."

On the suspension itself

"I will be the first to say I've never been a big fan of the HFA."

A sitting governor distancing from his own agency

"If we had $25 billion to do the recovery on day one, it might have been finished by now."

Defending pace of recovery spending

"I don't know if this is a political stunt today."

Questioning timing with early voting start
HUD's Claims vs. Bryan's Counter-Arguments
Spending Pace
HUD

29% of $1.92B spent after 9 years — depriving residents of ~$1.3B

Bryan

Match requirement delays; USVI had to fight FEMA for reimbursement "backwards"

Fraud Controls
HUD

Fraud risk "at or below lowest desired level" — anti-fraud activities absent or disorganized

Bryan

"A lot of protocols have been put in place" — says issues were 2–3 years old and corrected

COO Conviction
HUD

Richardson's criminal conduct legally imputed to VIHFA; no meaningful corrective action post-indictment

Bryan

Did not directly address the legal imputation argument at the press briefing

Timing / Motive
HUD

Cites four OIG audits spanning 2016–2026 and ongoing OIG investigation as basis

Bryan

"Why does Fox News in particular have it?" — suspects political motivation tied to early voting

07 · VIIQ

What Happens Next

30-day window · final action risk · existing funds status
30-Day Response Window

VIHFA must submit a written hearing request to DEC-Docket@HUD.gov within 30 days of receiving the notice. The response must identify specific facts contradicting HUD's claims — a general denial is insufficient.

If No Response

The suspension becomes final agency action — a permanent bar from procurement and nonprocurement transactions throughout the entire federal executive branch, not just HUD.

Existing Funds Unaffected

Already-allocated CDBG-DR funds — including the $749.6M remaining balance expiring September 30, 2029 — are not affected by the suspension. Only future federal transactions are barred.

Sources: HUD Suspension Letter (July 20, 2026) · OIG Audits 2016-AT-1001, 2023-FW-1002, 2023-FW-1003, 2026-FW-1002 · VI Consortium · St. Thomas Source · VI Daily News · Legislature of the VI · VI.gov · Questions or tips: signal@viiq.org

08 · VIIQ

How Recovery Is Really Done

Case study: Texas GLO · Hurricane Harvey 2017 · Same disaster year, same program, radically different results

VIHFA and the Texas General Land Office (GLO) both received massive CDBG-DR allocations after the same 2017 hurricane season. Both agencies were tasked with the same job under the same federal rules. What happened next tells you everything about what leadership, accountability, and execution actually look like in disaster recovery.

VIHFA — U.S. Virgin Islands
29%
of $1.92B spent — 9 years after Hurricanes Irma & Maria
Homeowner rehab completed ~72 homes
Fraud convictions 1 (Richardson) + pending
Federal suspensions 1 — July 20, 2026
Executive directors in 9 yrs 4 (2 interim stints)
Multifamily units rebuilt 319 of 1,643 projected
Grid recovery spent <1% of $67M allocated
Texas GLO — Hurricane Harvey
~70%+
of housing programs complete — by year 7, all homeowner programs closed out
Homeowner homes rebuilt 9,100+ homes
Fraud convictions 0
Federal suspensions 0
Commissioners in 9 yrs 2 (Bush → Buckingham)
Multifamily units rebuilt 5,909 units across 81 developments
Reimbursement program 2,962 families, $86M — complete 2021
Context note: Texas received far more funding ($5.7B vs. $1.92B) and had a larger disaster footprint, making a direct per-unit comparison imperfect. But the GLO administered a fundamentally different scale of complexity — 49 counties, 154,000 flooded homes — and still outperformed. The performance gap is not explained by scale. It is explained by execution.
Homes Rebuilt — VIHFA vs. Texas GLO (homeowner programs)
VIHFA (USVI) Texas GLO
Cumulative Spending Pace — % of housing allocation disbursed by year
VIHFA (USVI) Texas GLO
Parallel timelines — same starting gun, different races
🏚 VIHFA (USVI)
⭐ Texas GLO
Year 1
2017–18
Hurricane Irma & Maria hit Sep 2017. VIHFA receives initial CDBG-DR allocation Feb 2018. Griffith confirmed as Executive Director. No action plan submitted until months later.
Hurricane Harvey hits Aug 2017. Texas GLO receives $5B CDBG-DR allocation Feb 2018. Action plan filed within 6 weeks. Homeowner Assistance Program design begins immediately.
Year 2
2018–19
EnVIsion Tomorrow not yet launched. Funds sit unobligated. OIG begins flagging slow-start concerns. Application systems not yet built.
Homeowner Assistance Program opens. First reimbursements begin Q1 2019. Contractor procurement underway across 48 counties. Harris County begins submitting reimbursements.
Year 3
2019–20
EnVIsion Tomorrow launches — 5 years of programming in theory. First OIG audit identifies duplicate FEMA billing despite 2019 warning. Application system overwhelmed. Zero homes completed.
Reimbursement program approves more than 2,300 applications, $67M+ disbursed. Multifamily affordable rental program ($588M) activates. 82 developments under contract.
Year 4
2020–21
Richardson lumber contract approved Jan 2021 — $4.5M in CDBG-DR funds steered to fraudulent scheme. FEMA duplication billing continues. Griffith departs Feb 2022 as fraud runs on his watch.
Reimbursement program completes Jan 2021 — all 2,962 eligible applicants served, $86M fully disbursed. 2,500th home rebuilt milestone hit. 5,500 Harvey homeowners helped to date.
Year 5
2021–22
Clendinen steps in as interim for 2+ years. $6.2M FEMA duplication billing period. OIG Audit I & II underway. EnVIsion Tomorrow reports: 30 homes completed of 440 targeted.
Homeowner Assistance Program rebuilds 1,000th home milestone. GLO takes over some Houston/Harris programs after local delays. Multifamily ARP: every project in portfolio now complete or under construction.
Year 6
2022–23
Richardson indicted June 2024. VIHFA extends his fraudulent ISG contract for 3 more years without audit. Jones hired to "fix" agency. $315M of $1.1B total spending reported at Jones departure.
5,909 affordable rental units rebuilt or under construction. GLO publishes full quarterly performance reports publicly. Program cost savings of $3M returned to program rather than absorbed by administration.
Year 7–9
2024–26
HUD suspends VIHFA July 20, 2026. ED post still vacant. $1.3B unspent. 30-day window to respond or face permanent federal bar. 72 homeowner rehabs completed of 440 targeted, 9 years after the storm.
All Harvey homeowner housing programs complete. 9,100+ homes rebuilt, 4,400+ repairs reimbursed across 49 counties. GLO Commissioner announces "national leader" status. 13,500+ families served total. No federal suspensions.
VIIQ · What the data shows

What Texas Did That VIHFA Didn't

Six structural differences in the same federal program
Action plan in weeks, not years

Texas GLO filed its action plan within weeks of receiving its allocation. VIHFA took months and launched EnVIsion Tomorrow two full years after funding arrived. In disaster recovery, the clock starts at the disaster, not when the bureaucracy is ready.

🏗
Contractors before desks

The GLO procured construction contractors before programming was finalized — building the pipeline in parallel, not in sequence. VIHFA spent years designing programs before a single contractor was on the ground. The result: homes started appearing in Texas within 18 months of funding.

🔎
Transparent public reporting

The GLO published quarterly performance reports publicly with complete program-by-program data. Citizens, legislators, and HUD could see the numbers in real time. VIHFA's own annual audits were years behind — the agency was completing FY2020 audits in FY2022.

🧾
Cost savings returned to residents

When the GLO's reimbursement program came in $3M under budget, that money went back to assist more applicants — not to consultants, not to administration. VIHFA's admin budget consumed 55% of its set-aside at a rate faster than the actual recovery spending.

🏛
Stable, accountable leadership

The GLO had two commissioners over nine years — both with defined electoral accountability. VIHFA had four directors, two of them "interim" stints by the same person, with the ED post vacant at the moment of the federal suspension. No accountability, no urgency, no results.

🛡
Anti-fraud controls that actually worked

The GLO completed its Harvey homeowner programs with zero fraud convictions. VIHFA's 2026 OIG audit found fraud risk "at or below the lowest desired level" with "anti-fraud activities absent or disorganized." One agency built controls into procurement. The other built them into the press release.

The bottom line

The federal government sent the same program, the same rules, and comparable funding to both Texas and the USVI after the same hurricane season. One state rebuilt more than 9,100 homes and completed its programs with zero fraud convictions and zero federal suspensions. The other completed 72 homes in nine years, produced a convicted federal criminal serving 36 months in prison, and was suspended by HUD for "blatant mismanagement."

The difference between those two outcomes is not the program. It is not the funding. It is not even the weather. It is leadership, accountability, and execution — three things that are entirely within the USVI government's control.

Texas GLO — Year 4 milestone
5,500
families helped by Jan 2021 — 3.5 years after Harvey
VIHFA — Year 7 milestone
~72
homeowner rehabs completed as of Feb 2024 — 6.5 years after Irma

VIIQ observation

When Governor Bryan said "if we had $25 billion to do the recovery on day one, it might have been finished by now," he was making a math argument. The Texas GLO received $5.7 billion and completed its programs in seven years for more than 13,500 families. VIHFA received $1.92 billion and in nine years helped roughly 72 homeowner households while losing at least $4.5 million to fraud. The problem is not the money. The problem is what was done with it.